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Introduction 
 
The internet is driving three major trends in politics that is creating disconnection 
and disruption to the way politics and governance in conducted. These are:  
 
 New expectations: voters have a growing sense that political parties and 
law-making are out of touch, but not that politics is irrelevant. This is 
understandable given the changes in the way we interact with other parts of 
our lives. Online life is instant, transparent, easy and connected – while 
politics is often slow, laborious and secretive. How can politics meet 
people’s new expectations about decision-making? 
 
 New affiliations and locations: The model of mass membership political 
parties is losing support, at least in its current form. Across Europe, formal 
party membership is dwindling in most countries. But people are interested 
in new forms of affiliation, especially through social media and alternative 
networks. Digital technology allows people to find myriad new ways to 
express their political views publicly, outside of formal political spaces. 
Every day there are millions of conversations about political issues in new 
digital spaces: on Twitter timelines, Facebook newsfeeds, comment threads, 
blogs and videos. This new “digital commons” reflects the hopes, views and 
beliefs of citizens – but it is not easy to connect these new debates to formal 
political engagement at the moment. Political institutions still expect voters 
to come to them, but their websites are not where the action is. How to take 
political issues to the places where there is hot debate nowadays? 
 
 New sources and types of information: The internet has made vast 
amounts of data, and a huge range of information sources across an 
enormous spectrum of issues, available to every human with an internet 
connection. How is this information overload affecting engagement with 
politics? Web sources are also dramatically changing the nature of political 
reporting and journalism, making it far more dynamic and pluralistic. At the 
same time, competition from web-based sources and social media is forcing 
traditional mainstream media outlets to change their business models. How 
to keep political reporting accurate and pluralistic so that voters get reliable 
information on which to make their political choices? How to ensure voters, 
representatives and institutions are not overwhelmed with data and switch 
off? 
 
Each of these is both an opportunity and a challenge. This short paper does not 
claim to have answers to how to best navigate this changing environment; more 
modestly, it aims to sketch out the broad contours of the opportunities and 
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challenges the internet creates for democracy, and to draw out recommendations 
for improving the experience of democracy for citizens at EU level. The research 
presented is predominantly from the UK, with data from other European 
countries where available.1 
 
The paper is divided into four sections. First, we examine each of these three 
trends, based on a review of existing literature and material. Second, we present 
new research about how Twitter is being used by European citizens to 
communicate with MEPs. Third we review examples and short case-studies of 
initiatives that use technology to bring more people into politics. Fourth, we review 
some of the risks and challenges of introducing digital reforms into democratic 
systems – which are too often overlooked. We conclude with a small number of 
modest recommendations for how political institutions – and particularly the 
European Parliament – can adapt more quickly to the challenges of digital 
democracy in order to use it to re-engage with voters.  
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1. New challenges for democracy in the digital age 
 
Below we set out three key trends currently affecting politics. Although not a 
comprehensive list – and not solely about technology – we think they are 
important trends that together illustrate some of the challenges presented to 
traditional politics by digital life.  
 
 
Trend 1: New expectations   
 
Across Europe, there is a very broad and sustained trend of citizens losing trust 
and confidence in the way politics is being done. According to a 2014 Ipsos MORI 
poll, just 16 per cent of Britons trust politicians to tell the truth – a lower number 
than trust estate agents or bankers.2 In Germany, 68 per cent distrust politicians, 
while 86 per cent of French people do. Despite a small upturn in the most recent 
poll, the latest Eurobarometer survey shows that just 32 per cent of British adults 
trust parliament, while 28 per cent of French citizens, 40 per cent of Germans and 
only 24 per cent of Italians trust their government.3 
 
Voting is the most visible and personal experience of engagement in politics. But 
there is a generational divide between voters. In the 2010 UK election, 74 per cent 
of people over the age of 55 voted, compared to just 44 per cent of 18-24 year 
olds. This is a reflection of attitudes: 70 per cent of people in their 70s think it is a 
duty to vote, whereas just 50 per cent of people in their 20s agree. (This could be a 
cohort effect rather than just age-related: in the 1950s, when today’s 70 year olds 
were in their 20s, voter turnout was an all-time high).  
 
Outside the UK, similar patterns are evident. Voter turnout in the 2009 Bundestag 
elections was the lowest ever, at 70.8 per cent – but 80 per cent of 60-69 year olds 
voted, whereas only 59 per cent of 21-24 year olds did.4 In France’s 2014 
European elections, 42 per cent of the total population turned out, but only 28 per 
cent of 18-24 year olds did so, against 51 per cent of the over-55s.5 Across the 
whole of the EU, voter turnout in the May 2014 European Parliament election was 
51 per cent of over-55s, but only 28 per cent of 18-24 year olds.6  
 
Exactly what is behind these trends are not entirely clear. Causation is hard to 
establish given all the other trends that are affecting trust, from revelations of 
corruption to the economic crisis. But one way that people’s digital experience 
could be changing their attitudes towards politics is that they interpret the slowness 
of responses and inaccessibility of processes in that realm as a sign of aloofness, 
rather the result of the old technology used in politics.  
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The digital revolution has enabled people to speak their minds far more easily, get 
more involved in creating information, and interacting with each other. Take 
online commerce. Not only do consumers feel better for getting complaints off 
their chests, but user-generated feedback online keeps e-commerce ticking over. 
When we purchase a product online, not only do we have easy access to the views 
of other people, but we can leave feedback too, and it will be viewed and acted 
upon by others. This gives the manufacturer or service provider a major incentive 
to pay attention to what we see. 
 
We can also get involved in the production of the material. When we visit 
Wikipedia, we get an incredibly good encyclopaedia for free: but we also see how it 
was created, the debates behind its entries, and we can write or edit entries 
ourselves.  When it comes to news content, social media has made us into active 
producers of information – ‘citizen journalists’ – rather than passive consumers of 
other people’s views. We make the news these days, as well as watch it.   
 
The typical experience of a European citizen in much of daily life involves digital 
technology – and that technology is changing many aspects of it. For example, the 
average European citizens spend around four hours a day online – and a growing 
proportion of it via smartphones.7  The UK telecoms regulator Ofcom has found 
that British adults spend an average of eight hours and 41 minutes a day on media 
devices, against an average night’s sleep of eight hours and 21 minutes.8 From 
shopping to socialising, to watching television, to booking holidays, to 
communicating with friends, to accessing news, the internet has transformed many 
aspects of Europeans’ lives.   
 
The overwhelming majority of this sort of online activity is ignored by political 
processes. Researchers and academics have long noted this disconnection with the 
technology of politics, which remains offline and clunky by comparison: voting 
once every few years, responding to consultation documents from time to time, 
writing to elected officials. For a while, speed looked like the way to bridge the 
digital chasm, to make politics more like an e-commerce experience – quick, 
seamless and easy. Technophiles have also written about the possibilities of 
returning to direct democracy where, thanks to digital technology and processing 
power, every citizen can vote directly on every single issue and policy. 
 
Others are more sceptical. Political scientist Gerry Stoker points out that most 
citizens do not care to engage in politics on a regular basis – so the last reform that 
would interest them is more participation.9 Indeed, Hansard research found that 
only 29 per cent of British voters think that having more of a say (e.g. more 
referendums and more consultation) would bring about a significant improvement 
in the political system.10  
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The bigger change required is not about speed and choice-based convenience: 
most voters recognise that politics is a more complicated business than choosing a 
pair of jeans. Direct democracy is not itself an answer to many of society’s 
challenges.  
 
We believe that the answer lies in the quality of engagement, not just speed, ease or 
quantity of opportunities. Quality is about how citizens are involved in political 
processes. It requires transparency not just in the amount of information put on 
websites, but that the data is searchable, shareable, discussed, and acted upon. If 
voters feel that the systems and procedures that govern how decisions are taken 
are aloof, closed, incomprehensible and unaccountable, then they won’t value the 
democratic processes where their participation is vital. When we experience a 
better quality of engagement, where we can get involved personally, then we are 
more likely to trust the interlocutor. 
 
To improve the quality of engagement in politics is particularly important at EU 
level, where decision-making is obscure, hard to understand and often sclerotic. 
Many of the negotiations are between governments and institutions far removed 
from the average voters, on highly technical issues. What’s more, the pressure to 
increase efficiency and speed in EU-level decision-making has led the institutions 
to do more of their negotiations behind closed doors, creating an even more 
unsatisfactory and opaque experience for citizens.11  
 
 
Trend 2: Changing affiliations and locations of politics    
 
The disengagement of the younger generation from the formal process of politics 
extends beyond voting and attitudes. Young people are less likely to have a party 
allegiance than in previous years.  Three million people were members of the 
British Conservative Party in the 1950s, and another million of the Labour Party. 
Now, membership is at a historic low: Labour has 270,000 members while the 
Conservatives reportedly have under 150,000 (the Labour figure has likely 
increased with the introduction of a new membership tier, which helped lead to the 
selection of the current leader, Jeremy Corbyn).12 Only two per cent of voters in 
Germany and France are members of a mainstream political party.13 Moreover, 
non-party mass membership organisations are not shrinking: for example, the UK 
charity The National Trust has over 4 million paid-up members, which is far more 
than all the British political parties combined.14  
 
Yet young people have not stopped wanting to improve their lives and 
communities. According to the latest UK Community Life Survey, they are more 
likely to take part in formal volunteering than any other age bracket. Many also 
have strongly held views about issues ranging from living costs, affordable housing 
and unemployment to the National Health Service and online privacy. Indeed, 
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Eurobarometer data from 2012 suggests that while young people vote less than 
other age groups, they are over-represented in alternative political actions such as 
strikes, NGO membership and participation in demonstrations.15 They are also 
more likely than older voters to think that voting in the European elections is an 
effective way of influencing decision-making (63 per cent of 15-24 year olds against 
51 per cent of over-55s).16  
 
These findings present a paradox: young people think that voting in the European 
elections can influence decision making; and they are still the group in the 
population that votes the least.  
 
But political activity is still happening, just in different venues and in different ways 
from previous eras. Very often it is taking place entirely outside traditional political 
structures. There are many aspects to this change, but many polls and surveys 
attest to the increasing significance of the internet as a political channel across 
Europe, independent of parties and parliaments. According to Eurobarometer 
data:  
 
 15-24 years olds are the most likely to use the internet as a channel for 
political debate, and to think that it is an effective type of political action.17  
 
 42 per cent of 15-24 year olds have expressed their views on public issues 
on the internet or through social media, compared to an average of 28 per 
cent.18 
 
 Younger people are also more likely to think that the internet represents 
progress for democracy, because it allows everyone to take part in public 
debate.19 
 
The way that social media is changing political engagement and activism is a 
relatively new area of research, but recent studies – particularly in the UK – 
indicate that the internet has become a vital new avenue of political activity. 
According to Demos research, social media is now vital to political activism. A 
representative poll of 1000 British social media users revealed that over half of 
them either sent or received political material on social media over the last three 
months, totalling around 11 million people overall. This is greater than the number 
of social media users who reported participating in politics or activism offline. 
What’s more, this activity is proactive, not passive. In the three months to May 
2015, as many people (40 per cent) contributed political content on social media as 
received it (38 per cent).20  
 
This activism seems to encourage people to get more involved in politics. The 
majority of Brits surveyed felt that social media improved the democratic process 
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by encouraging more open discussion and greater access to debate. They better 
understand the issues and what the parties stood for; they feel more engaged in the 
political debate; and they are more likely to vote. If extrapolated to all 23 million 
social media users in the UK, it would mean that over 4 million people felt they 
understood the general election campaign better, and were more likely to vote as a 
result of political activity on social media. 
 
Online platforms also provide new methods of accessing politics for upstart 
movements that previously had few means of reaching a broad public. This creates 
a different kind of challenge to established politics: new possibilities for creating 
and sharing information – as well as cheap new methods of organising and 
mobilising – are making it easier than ever for new movements to emerge and 
grow quickly.  
 
For example, the Five Star Movement in Italy went from polling under five per 
cent to winning 25 per cent of the national vote in just a year thanks in large part 
to its online organising and despite refusing to engage with mainstream media. 
Before the digital age, such a new movement would have taken years to build a 
voter base because it would have had to create local and national infrastructure. Its 
politicians would have had to rely on broadcasters and large newspapers to take 
them seriously to get press coverage and make themselves known to voters. Five 
Star demonstrated that now a grassroots, internet enabled movement is possible – 
and can be an effective way of controlling the message and public image.21  
 
What effect is the rapid rise of new web-based movements having on democracy? 
Certainly the new parties and movements are channelling much more energy into 
politics as voters become ‘netizens’ through online political activity. Similar 
examples are Podemos in Spain and the Pirate Party in various countries. They are 
also posing a major challenge to established parties, whose infrastructure of offices, 
local constituency organisations and membership is no longer a decisive advantage. 
The political market in most countries used to be an oligopoly of a few large 
parties, but now the barriers to new entrants have dropped very low, increasing the 
competition for attention and votes. Networks are becoming more powerful vis-à-
vis established institutions, as in many other domains affected by the internet.  
 
Some of the mainstream parties may find it difficult to adapt, but others could be 
dynamised by the new competition into adopting new methods that connect better 
with voters. Barack Obama in the US and Jeremy Corbyn in the UK both used 
internet mobilisation to attract younger voters to support their campaigns. 
 
The implications for the democratic functioning of the political system as currently 
constituted depend less on whether old parties succeed in keeping their share of 
the vote than on the issues and style of debate that the new movements bring into 
politics. If new movements created and largely run on the internet feed broad 
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public debates and stimulate new thinking, they can bring new dynamism. But if 
they become “small tent” parties that appeal to nativism to marginalise minorities 
and exclude some parts of society, they could do harm to democratic processes.  
 
 
Trend 3: Changing information creation, access and use  
 
In addition to changes to explicitly political activity, there are also major changes in 
the way that people find, access, consume, create and share information about 
politics.   
 
Most obviously, the internet is changing where and how people get their political 
information. Interestingly, it seems to vary by ethnicity. Research conducted in 
2015 UK found that people belonging to an ethnic minority are more likely to get 
news from the internet and less likely to get news from newspapers than white 
British adults. Around 14 per cent of white British adults now principally receive 
their news from the internet – compared to 32 per cent of British Pakistanis.22 The 
role of social media platforms also varies by age. According to the Eurobarometer, 
young people are the most likely to trust the internet as a source of information,23 
and the most likely to use social networks (29 per cent of 15-24 year olds against 
20 per cent average) as a source of political information.24 
 
The connection between social media platforms and political and electoral 
decisions needs more research. A representative poll of British adults by Ipsos 
MORI and King’s College London just before the May 2015 UK general election 
found that 13 per cent of people expected social media to influence their vote; it 
was the fourth most influential factor after the leadership debates (40 per cent), 
newspapers (20 per cent), and election broadcasts (16 per cent). This was a 
significant increase from 2% of people who said it would influence their vote in 
2010. Furthermore, its influence was highly subject to the age of the respondent; 
34% of 18-24 year olds said it would influence their vote.  
 
This transformation in the way people access, consume and create information 
creates several opportunities and challenges. Democracies are facing a novel 
situation in respect of information: we’ve moved from an age of scarcity to deluge. 
In addition to the growing volume of data generated by citizens themselves, there 
is now far more data available about politics and political institutions to the general 
public.  
 
A growing proportion of internet activity is ‘user generated’, meaning that content 
produced by users, which enters public life directly, without the intervention or 
mediation of any kind of expert or professional gatekeeper, whether a newspaper 
editor, publisher, academic peer reviewer or anthologist. This has made more 
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information readily available to more people, and democratises the production of 
information, but it results in more misleading information being available too.  
 
This has increased the ideological range of opinion and discussion that is visible, 
and also the quantity of both very good and very poor facts claiming to be true.  
The 2011 Demos report Truth, Lies and the Internet argued that the range of 
mistakes, half-truths, propaganda and patent falsehoods now present online is 
challenging people’s capacity, especially that of young people, to tell good and bad 
information apart.25 The presence of socially problematic forms of speech on 
social media has become an acute social problem, from trolling, hate speech and 
misogyny online, to the prevalence of terrorist propaganda and recruitment.  
 
The rise of social media has also undermined the capacity of any central authority – 
including governmental bodies and law enforcement agencies – to remove socially 
problematic or illegal content from the public domain. It is difficult for citizens to 
manage the information deluge, to discriminate between different information, to 
tell truth from fiction, and to determine the extent to which certain claims should 
be accepted or acted upon.  
 
The same holds true for European politicians. They also receive vast volumes of 
user generated data, as our research will demonstrate below. Traditional methods 
of understanding public opinion, such as representative polls or direct interaction 
with constituents, have been supplemented – although certainly not entirely 
replaced – by new online expressions of public opinion such as online lobbying 
groups, e-petitions, Facebook pages and Twitter campaigns. This has potentially 
important political implications. For example, no social media trend is nakedly a 
proxy for public opinion. Only certain parts of society use social media platforms, 
and usually a small number of ‘power users’ dominate even this conversation. 
What’s more, online trends and virals can be engineered. A new breed of ‘guerilla’ 
marketing agency has sprung up with promised expertise in ‘seeding’ virals on the 
Internet. It’s a difficult art, but a small number of skilful viral marketers can make a 
carefully engineered campaign look like an organic and spontaneous outburst of 
public sentiment.  
 
The new ways – and speed – that information is created and shared is also 
changing how and what subjects become politically salient. In 2014, the 
#BringBackOurGirls Twitter campaign started by Nigerian lawyer Ibrahim 
Abdullahi gained international attention. The issue of civilian security and 
terrorism in northern Nigeria subsequently became a major part of the national 
Nigerian election campaign that year. In Europe, the image of Alan Kurdi, the 
three year-old who died on a Greek beach after the boat carrying him across the 
Mediterranean from Syria capsized, became the icon of the worst refugee crisis 
since the Second World War. Many European newspapers were very slow to print 
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the images, and when they did, it was because social media users had already 
posted it online. 
 
The ultimate effects of this change in news and media consumption on broader 
attitudes about politics are still unknown. Some researchers consider that the 
growth of user-generated content online may result in a more polemical and 
polarised political debate. Certainly, online hate speech is growing quickly, and it 
includes sustained, targeted attacks on individuals and groups. But by 
democratising the creation of information, the internet makes a far wider diversity 
of opinion available to people – often for free – which brings more people into the 
political process. This is a very positive development because it brings greater 
engagement and pluralism, countering the trend of polarisation. 
 
The vital challenge now is to see how democracies and citizens can best navigate 
and make use of big data and unmediated information in ways that support open 
and free societies. One key aspect of this challenge is how the clever use of 
technology could allow political institutions to provide more information to the 
public in forms that allay their suspicions about elite-driven political decisions, to 
demonstrate the trade-offs involved in policy decisions, and to allow greater 
participation. Equally, it is vital to find out how technology can help citizens hold 
their elected officials to account, and encourage greater transparency and 
accountability. Digital technology can undoubtedly help in this endeavour, but 
cannot realise it alone.  
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2. NEW RESEARCH ON THE PRACTICE OF DIGITAL POLITICS: how 
parliamentarians use twitter 
 
Despite these significant changes in political activity, there has been little research 
to date that examines the exactly how they are being felt. In particular, little is 
known about the specific ways in which users and elected officials are using social 
media for political purposes.  
 
To help address this gap, we have conducted new primary research on how EU 
parliamentarians and voters are using Twitter in order to share information and 
communicate with each other online. While Twitter is not the only social media 
platform used for this purpose, and nor is direct interaction between elected 
officials and citizens the only way it is used for political purposes, this research 
illustrates one dimension of how political discussion and debate are moving online 
at both national and EU levels.   
 
 
Method  
 
Using Twitter’s Application Programming Interface, we collected all tweets in all 
languages sent either to or from MEPs for one month between 12 March and 12 
April 2015 (tweets are the way users communicate with each other on the 
platform). This includes every tweet sent by one of the 504 MEPs whose Twitter 
accounts we were able to identify and verify when collection commenced, and 
every mention of an MEP’s username in a tweet posted by any user of the 
platform during the month. We collected only tweets from public accounts.26 (The 
number of MEPs on Twitter since we conducted this research as increased 
slightly). We then subjected the data to a series of analyses turning on the metadata 
contained in each tweet. 
 
When a tweet is sent, data about that tweet is attached to the tweet itself, such as 
the time, place, language and who the tweet was sent to. By aggregating this 
metadata and combining it with offline data (such as the nation or European 
Parliamentary Group the sender/receiver belongs to), we can perform large-scale 
analyses on the EU parliament as a whole.  
 
In total, the 504 MEPs sent 39,556 tweets over the period – an average of 78 each, 
though some sent just a single tweet during the period and others sent almost a 
thousand. When we included all tweets that mention an MEP’s user name (posted 
by any user of the platform), we found 1,074,910 tweets from 238,974 users. That 
means that, of those MEPs included in this dataset, each received an average of 
2,132 tweets each over this one month, and many of them got significantly more. 
Three MEPs received over 100,000 mentions during the period. In fact, we 
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anticipate that millions more are expressing their political views on the platform 
without using the MEP username that we used to identify relevant tweets. 
Nevertheless, this volume of interactions suggests that Twitter has become a 
significant site of democratic activism in Europe.  
 
The most prolific tweeters in our dataset were a mix.  
 
Table 1: Top MEP Twitter users by country and party group 
 
 
 
 
Of the top ten tweeters, five are from the UK and three are from Spain.  UK 
MEPs were the most active, accounting for around one third of all tweets sent, 
followed by Spanish MEPs (16 per cent), Italian (12 per cent) and French (8 per 
cent). There are clear discrepancies by nationality in the data. The UK is 
overrepresented on Twitter. Their 63 MEPs are also, on average, the most active 
during the period, averaging over 166 tweets each. Nations with smaller 
representations such as Ireland and Austria produced over a hundred tweets per 
MEP during the period. Despite both having 10 representatives in our sample, 
Irish MEPs sent five times as many tweets as Danish MEPs over the period.  
 
There are also striking differences in Twitter usage by party group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank Name Country Group Tweets Sent
1 Margot PARKER UK Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group 990
2 David COBURN UK Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group 984
3 Inés  AYALA SENDER Spain
Group of the Progress ive Al l iance of Socia l i s ts  and 
Democrats  in the European Parl iament
927
4 Michel  REIMON Austria Group of the Greens/European Free Al l iance 758
5 Jul ie WARD UK
Group of the Progress ive Al l iance of Socia l i s ts  and 
Democrats  in the European Parl iament
687
6 Lara  COMI Ita ly
Group of the European People's  Party (Chris tian 
Democrats)
686
7 Ian DUNCAN UK European Conservatives  and Reformists  Group 613
8 Nathan GILL UK Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group 607
9 Elena VALENCIANO Spain
Group of the Progress ive Al l iance of Socia l i s ts  and 
Democrats  in the European Parl iament
526
10
Juan Carlos  
GIRAUTA VIDAL
Spain
Group of the Al l iance of Libera ls  and Democrats  for 
Europe
509
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Table 2: Tweets sent broken down by Parliamentary Group  
 
 
Although the Socialists and Democrats grouping and the Christian Democrats 
grouping sent the most tweets during the month we collected, this is mostly a 
result of the fact they have significantly more MEPs than other groups. Indeed, it 
is the smaller groupings that are the most active. For example, the Freedom and 
Direct Democracy Group was three times more active than the Christian 
Democrats, sending on average 165 tweets per MEP during the period. 
Proportionate to their size, Eurosceptic MEPs use Twitter much more than 
parliamentarians from the main parties who outnumber them among the 751 total 
members. Two of the MEPs in the top five listed above belong to another 
Eurosceptic party group, ‘Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy’.  
 
We also measured which MEPs received the most tweets from other user 
(measured as number of interactions).  
 
Those MEPs that received the most number of tweets can be broadly broken 
down into two groups. Those on the right-wing, and those in the public eye. Seven 
of the ten most mentioned MEPs were right-wing. Nigel Farage, the most 
mentioned MEP during the month we collected data, was at the time leading the 
euro-sceptic UKIP party in the UK, and was therefore at the centre of a lot of 
media attention the UK. The breakdown is below. 
 
 
 
 
 
European Parliamentary Group Tweets Sent # MEPs on Twitter Average # Tweets Sent
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group 4963 30 165.4
Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance 4495 42 107.0
Confederal Group of the European United Left - 
Nordic Green Left
3077 36 85.5
European Conservatives and Reformists Group 3913 49 79.9
Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats in the European Parliament
9863 127 77.7
Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
for Europe
3271 47 69.6
Non-attached Members 2162 32 67.6
Group of the European People's Party (Christian 
Democrats)
7179 132 54.4
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Table 3: MEPs receiving the most tweets from other users   
 
 
(Note - four of the top ten (highlighted in blue) were at the time non-attached members representing 
far-right parties from Italy and France respectively) 
 
When broken down by country, on average, Spanish MEPs received the most 
number of tweets per representative during the period. This analysis shows that 
Twitter users are more likely to turn to Twitter to contact Spanish, French and 
British MEPs than Czech, Romanian and Slovakian MEPs. This may be due to the 
respective interest in the platform in the different member states.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank Name Country European Parliamentary Group Tweets Received
1 Nigel FARAGE UK
Europe of Freedom and Direct 
Democracy Group
131110
2 Teresa RODRIGUEZ-RUBIO Spain
Confederal Group of the European 
United Left - Nordic Green Left
120189
3 Matteo SALVINI Italy Non-attached Members 119747
4 Marine LE PEN France Non-attached Members 87174
5 Pablo IGLESIAS Spain
Confederal Group of the European 
United Left - Nordic Green Left
80109
6 Florian PHILIPPOT France Non-attached Members 41891
7 Jean-Marie LE PEN France Non-attached Members 28671
8 Pablo ECHENIQUE Spain
Confederal Group of the European 
United Left - Nordic Green Left
24437
9 Andrzej DUDA Poland
European Conservatives and 
Reformists Group
22924
10 Daniel HANNAN UK
European Conservatives and 
Reformists Group
17016
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Table 4: Tweets received by MEPs broken down by nationality 
 
 
 
 
When broken down by Parliamentary group, it is a similar set of results to those 
above relating to which MEPs send tweets. On average, the smaller groupings were 
more likely to receive tweets than the larger parties (we have not established any 
causal pattern here).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Tweets Received # MEPs on Twitter Average # Tweets Received
Spain 258922 35 2876.9
France 204706 69 1861.0
UK 224093 65 1474.3
Italy 169029 67 1432.4
Poland 32472 31 705.9
Sweden 13038 15 383.5
Greece 5713 12 285.7
Ireland 5349 10 214.0
Netherlands 14251 23 182.7
Germany 22046 63 153.1
Austria 5563 14 139.1
Slovenia 1631 7 108.7
Finland 3309 13 103.4
Belgium 5958 22 78.4
Denmark 1095 12 73.0
Lithuania 542 6 67.8
Hungary 508 7 63.5
Latvia 1054 8 58.6
Czech 2279 18 57.0
Portugal 1020 10 46.4
Malta 448 5 44.8
Croatia 604 9 37.8
Luxembourg 413 4 29.5
Romania 848 19 24.9
Bulgaria 713 9 23.0
Estonia 815 6 22.0
Slovakia 166 7 20.8
Cyprus 142 3 20.3
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Table 5: Tweets received by MEPs, broken down by Parliamentary Group 
 
 
 
 
Styles of communication: how MEPs use Twitter 
 
Twitter can be used by parliamentarians in a variety of ways. There is no right or 
wrong way to use the platform, but differences in style can affect the quality of the 
interaction. For example, MEPs can use Twitter to reply to other users’ tweets 
directed at them, or simply to post a message. The former is more conversational 
in style, while the latter is broadcasting.  
 
Of those who sent at least 31 tweets (an average of one tweet per day during our 
collection period), we identified the top ten MEPs by percentage of tweets that 
were replies to other users’ tweets. Note: the average Twitter user on the platform 
as a whole sends replies 35 per cent of the time. Only a small number of MEPs 
exceeded the average reply rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Parliamentary Group Tweets Received # MEPs on Twitter Average # Tweets Received
Non-attached Members 295806 36 5916.1
Confederal Group of the European United Left - 
Nordic Green Left
240959 37 3300.8
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group 176464 33 3095.9
European Conservatives and Reformists Group 51381 53 577.3
Group of the European People's Party (Christian 
Democrats)
71351 162 344.7
Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance 39634 47 333.1
Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
for Europe
34488 51 263.3
Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats in the European Parliament
56258 139 252.3
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Table 6: MEPs tweets broken down by proportion of replies  
 
 
 
Bill Etheridge of the UK was the MEP most likely to use Twitter as a means of 
responding directly to messages. 21 MEPs in the dataset who had sent tweets had 
not sent a single reply. Bas Belder, of the Netherlands, was the MEP using Twitter 
to broadcast the most: he sent 298 tweets during the period, but none of them 
were replies.  
 
When broken down by country, some countries’ MEPs were far more likely to use 
Twitter in this more interactive way. Hungarian MEPs were the most frequent 
repliers, with 28% of their tweets being replies. Eight of the countries represented 
were below 10%, including France. French MEPs sent just 320 replies from the 
3,866 tweets sent overall. The full breakdown is below. 
 
When broken down by party group, two of the smaller groups - Freedom and 
Direct Democracy and the Green/European Alliance – tend to use Twitter to 
interact and engage with other users, whereas the bigger mainstream groups more 
often use the platform to broadcast their messages. This supports other research 
work by Demos that suggests more radical movements tend to be better users of 
social media than mainstream parties.27 Twitter helps them to extend their support 
and allows their more extreme views to bypass the editorial checks used by 
mainstream media. 
 
 
 
 
Rank Name Country EPG Replies Tweets Sent % Replies
1 Bill ETHERIDGE UK
Europe of Freedom and Direct 
Democracy Group
62 102 60.8%
2 Christofer FJELLNER Sweden
Group of the European People's 
Party (Christian Democrats)
68 114 59.6%
3 Lara COMI Italy
Group of the European People's 
Party (Christian Democrats)
407 686 59.3%
4 György SCHÖPFLIN Hungary
Group of the European People's 
Party (Christian Democrats)
69 131 52.7%
5 Rebecca HARMS Germany
Group of the Greens/European Free 
Alliance
66 128 51.6%
6 Tomáš ZDECHOVSKÝ Czech
Group of the European People's 
Party (Christian Democrats)
105 226 46.5%
7 Bas EICKHOUT Netherlands
Group of the Greens/European Free 
Alliance
70 152 46.1%
8 Rina Ronja KARI Denmark
Confederal Group of the European 
United Left - Nordic Green Left
15 34 44.1%
9 Jonathan ARNOTT UK
Europe of Freedom and Direct 
Democracy Group
36 82 43.9%
10 Luke Ming FLANAGAN Ireland
Confederal Group of the European 
United Left - Nordic Green Left
155 364 42.6%
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Table 7: MEPs replies on Twitter, broken down by Parliamentary Group  
 
 
 
 
Despite receiving the most tweets, non-attached members appeared unwilling to 
reply to tweets, with less than one in 20 tweets constituting a reply.  
 
 
Tweets from voters and other users  
 
The majority of the tweets we collected were directed at MEPs by users around 
Europe.  Unsurprisingly, English is the most commonly used language. Spanish, 
French and Italian users also used the platform in large numbers, and constitute 
the majority (89%) of the tweets sent. Some tweets could not be classified, such as 
those containing just a link or a string of emojis. These are labelled as ‘Unknown’.  
The breakdown is below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Parliamentary Group Replies Tweets Sent % Reply Rate
Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance 998 4495 22.20%
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group 1071 4963 21.60%
Group of the European People's Party (Christian 
Democrats)
1422 7179 19.80%
Confederal Group of the European United Left - 
Nordic Green Left
525 3077 17.10%
European Conservatives and Reformists Group 655 3913 16.70%
Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
for Europe
492 3271 15.00%
Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats in the European Parliament
1310 9863 13.30%
Non-attached Members 85 2162 3.90%
 22 
 
Table 8: Language of tweets 
 
 
Patterns of use  
 
We analysed the different ways in which individual users are using platform when 
communicating with MEPs. Although some incidents are talked about across 
several languages, events often generate language-specific ‘Twitter storms’, as the 
graph below shows. However, the graph shows some overlap in spikes of tweets, 
which suggests that conversations about the EU often cross languages. There is an 
interesting correlation between French and Italian tweets, but further work would 
need to be performed to understand the probable cause.  
 
Figure 1: Tweets over time, plotted by language 
 
 
Language # Tweets % of Total Tweets # Unique Users
English 290319 27.0% 74241
Spanish 273256 25.4% 64616
French 209664 19.5% 47811
Italian 181777 16.9% 33334
Polish 33301 3.1% 4864
Unknown 24940 2.3% 15999
German 15751 1.5% 5876
Dutch 14738 1.4% 5973
Greek 6527 0.6% 2125
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In order to provide some content to the sort of tweets that users send their MEPs, 
we conducted a qualitative review of a random sample of 500 English language 
tweets that were send by users to MEPs (selected in proportion to party group size 
as a proportion of all MEPs on Twitter). A researcher at Demos manually sorted 
tweets according to whether they were about domestic or EU issues; the subject 
matter; and the tone of the tweet. The categories chosen were selected by the 
researcher, based on a method called grounded theory.28  
 
In the tables below, we set out the results in full, with illustrative examples from 
each category type. Interestingly, the data revealed that almost two-thirds of 
Twitter users preferred to talk to their MEPs about domestic issues, rather than 
EU-related ones.  
 
 
Table 9: tweets categorised by domestic and EU issues 
 
Tweet Category % of Tweets Sample tweet 
Domestic issues 63.6% 
@chrisrumfitt @DanHannanMEP @FraserNelson Has Ed said whether he 
would not form a coalition with the SNP yet? Nope. Thought not. 
EU issues 32.8% 
.@SebDance please vote wisely on Tue on #TTIP, to exclude healthcare 
from any trade deal (amendment on Section 1, point b, point vii) 
Other 3.6% 
@A_Mierce_Maecga @Coeurdelion87 @DanHannanMEP Absolutely 
correct. 
 
 
Of these issues, discussions about individual politicians and parties (and their 
public activities) were by far the most common subject matter, followed closely by 
concerns about the economy or social issues. This probably reflects the timing of 
the data collection period, which coincided with the May 2015 UK general 
election. But it is also a result of the disproportionate attention received by 
controversial personalities among the MEPs, such as Nigel Farage, who are the 
subject of considerable criticism and sometimes overt personal attacks. Around 15 
per cent of users chose to lobby their MEPs outright to vote on particular issues – 
particularly the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which was 
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a major decision going through the European Parliament at the time the data were 
collected.  
 
Twitter proved to be a significant as a platform for feedback and discussion should 
not be underestimated. Cumulatively, close to a third of users expressed support 
for MEPs’ viewpoints or defended their ideas in online debate, or shared news and 
updates with MEPs to solicit their opinions. 
 
 
Table 10: Tweets categorised by subject matter 
 
Subject Matter % of Tweets Sample 
Party / Politician 30.6% 
#BatleForNumber10 'Hell Yes', a tough #Miliband certainly scares the life 
out of me! @Nigel_Farage and @MayorofLondon will dictate future. 
Economy 15.4% 
@ClareMoodyMEP Hi Clare, EU taking UK 2court over tax breaks for 
small cider makers. Do you agree cider industry is important to SW & UK? 
Brexit / EU 
membership 12.6% 
.@DanHannanMEP: "EU leaders keep telling us the alternative to our EU 
membership is a free-trade-only relationship." Perfect! #WorksForMe 
Social 12.2% 
.@AdamRamsay @GreenKeithMEP State shd buy property for social rent 
to replace all sold- off council housing. Fund with QE sitting in banks. 
Immigration / 
Multiculturalism 9.4% 
#bbcdebates @Nigel_Farage immigrants pay taxes create jobs are net 
contributors to the economy.  We'd be poorer with your immigration cuts 
Other 8.6% 
@DanHannanMEP @Bruciebabe @DouglasCarswell It's because of the 
Twitter's 140 caracters limit per tweet. 
Personal Attacks 5.8% 
[Not included] 
Foreign Policy 5.4% 
.@richardhowitt Will you vote for the strongest means of stopping the 
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flow of #ConflictMinerals into Europe on Weds? http://t.co/3gJsZgmBmG 
 
To get a better sense of how users send messages to their MEPs, we categorised 
tweets by the tone taken. This revealed a high proportion that was critical, but a 
significant number (around one in five) was supportive.   
 
 
Table 11: Tweets categorised by tone 
 
Tweet Category % of Tweets Sample 
Critical 37.8% 
@Daily_Express @Nigel_Farage you seen the 
iPsos poll?? You have got no chance of an out 
vote #stopwastingeveryonestime 
Supportive 21% 
.@Nigel_Farage thank u nige,, 4 Standing up 4 
this country when no1 else will :) 
Neutral / News 16.8% 
@CharlesTannock what do you think about this 
article on a carbon price on imports to the EU? - 
http://t.co/TWhphAllmP @EDimantchev 
Lobbying 15.2% 
.@TimKirkhopeMEP @AmjadBashirMEP 
@RCorbettMEP Please stop #TTIP! Vote 
against it when you have the chance. 
Other / Unclear 5% 
@camstaquinn @Nigel_Farage 
Angry / abusive  4.2% 
[Not included] 
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Where tweets come from 
Twitter’s Application Programming Interface allows the meta-data associated with 
each tweet to be collected, including location data when available. Typically 1-3 per 
cent of tweets include a latitude and longitude within the meta-data, which is the 
exact location from which a tweet is posted (a ‘geo-tag’ that needs to be switched 
on by the person posting the tweet).  
 
In our dataset, there were 12,445 tweets with geo-located data of this type. Of 
those, 29 per cent were in English, 25 per cent Italian, 18 per cent Spanish and 12 
per cent French. The total numbers are laid out below, as well as the proportion of 
all tweets in that language. Every European language is represented in the dataset, 
but the four top languages made up 85% of the total dataset.  
 
 
Table 12: Location of geo-located tweets  
 
 
While only representing a small fraction of the data, this is nevertheless a sufficient 
volume from which to draw some broad conclusions about where tweets are being 
posted from. Below is a world map which shows from where all geo-located tweets 
were posted. As expected, they were overwhelmingly posted from within Europe, 
but there were clusters of activity in other continents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Language # of Geolocated  Tweets % of Total
English 3657 1.3%
Italian 3167 1.7%
Spanish 2268 0.8%
French 1503 0.7%
Unknown 585 2.3%
Polish 383 1.2%
Dutch 263 1.8%
German 149 0.9%
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Box 1: World map of all geo-located tweets sent to MEPs 
 
 
 
Within Europe, the majority of tweets are in the languages of the country from 
which they are posted; the English, French and Spanish and Italian language 
clusters are evident on the map.  
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Box 2: European map of all geo-located tweets sent to MEPs; filtered by Language 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Overall, this new research suggests that Twitter has become an important platform 
for democratic engagement in European politics, although activity is not uniform 
across all countries.  Nevertheless, over a quarter of  a million people used it to 
communicate with their MEPs over a one month period, and on a very wide range 
of  subjects, five-month period, including policy and political views. There are likely 
to be a very significant volume of  policy-relevant conversations on Twitter about 
European politics that we have not collected, which could be extremely valuable 
for MEPs and others to hear. 
 
However, the explosion of  Twitter activity creates a problem for MEPs. The very 
large amount of  tweets directed at them is likely to be too much for MEPs to 
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answer or even read personally. But if  they fail to keep up and become 
unresponsive, voters will think that they are aloof  and unengaged.  
 
MEPs from the smaller parties and party groups are more active on Twitter, and 
use it as a means of  engaging with voters as well as simply broadcasting their 
message. We speculate that this is partly contributing to their popularity, and it is in 
keeping with their self-styled position as representing a new type of  politics.  This, 
in particular, presents a challenge to traditional politics.  
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3. WAYS FORWARD: new initiatives in digital democracy 
 
The new research presented above shows just one way that elected representatives 
and citizens are adapting – in different ways and with very different degrees of 
success – to one aspect of technological change. Although limited in scope, this 
research illustrates an important way in which social media is connecting voters to 
political life at the EU level. 
 
This section will outline promising initiatives to apply digital technology to other 
aspects of politics and government in several parts of the world, for the purpose of 
improving or improving citizens’ experience of democracy.  While each is specific 
to the context in which it has been applied, together they offer useful indications 
of possible ways digital technology can be used to enhance democratic practice.  
 
 
Electoral campaigning and crowdfunding 
 
The most publicised way of using new technology is the focus of large political 
parties on using social media for electoral gain. Since Barack Obama’s successes in 
2008 and 2012, electoral campaigns across the world have entered the digital world 
as a new political battleground. In 2012, Obama’s campaign built an enormous 
digital presence of 45 million Facebook likes, 23 million Twitter followers, and 1 
million downloads of the campaign’s Facebook page. The success of this campaign 
showed politicians around the world how much this new digital space matters, and 
that they could convert online success into tangible, offline gains. The Democrats’ 
social network organised more than 358,000 offline events, with 1.1 million 
responses. According to Time magazine, the Obama campaign raised $690 million 
digitally in 2012, mainly in small cash donations from 4.4 million individuals. That 
constituted over half of the total $1.1 billion that he raised, showing the power of 
this new method of fundraising.  
 
Online campaigning is even more effective for new political movements that don’t 
want to look like traditional parties – even if they become a party once they win 
seats. Perhaps the best example in Europe is Beppe Grillo’s building of a network 
of millions of social media followers and the most popular blog in Italy in just a 
few months. Enraged by a series of corruption scandals, he founded a new political 
movement, the Five Star Movement, which became a furious, insurgent, anti-
corruption groundswell. Grillo refused to talk to the mainstream media, instead 
using online Meetup groups to build an army of volunteers. He spoke to Italians 
directly through his blog, and crowd-funded his campaign largely through digital 
communication. In 2012, the Five Star Movement was polling at around 5 per cent 
in the opinion polls for the parliamentary elections. The following year, Grillo’s 
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party won 1 in every 4 votes, making him the leader of the largest single party in 
Italy.  
 
In both these cases, dynamic politicians won by gaining personal affiliation from 
voters through social media, rather than using traditional party membership as a 
way of gaining the loyalty of their followers.  
 
 
Governance reforms 
 
Other new initiatives are using technology to improve the practice of democracy 
rather than to benefit a particular political party.  The best known in the UK is the 
e-petition. Following its launch by the government in 2011, any citizen or UK 
resident can create an e-petition to support a cause or ask for a change in policy or 
legislation, as well as sign other people’s petitions. Each petition is open for up to a 
year, after which it will be considered for debate in the House of Commons if it 
has collected 100,000 signatures. However, the Backbench Business Committee 
can only consider an e-petition for debate if an MP makes a case for the subject to 
be debated. In October 2012, the Hansard Society published a review of the first 
year of e-petitions which showed that 14,092 had been accepted, with three million 
unique signatures.  
 
The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) is a similar initiative at EU level that was 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. If 1 million citizens from at least four EU 
countries sign a petition inviting the European Commission to bring forward 
proposals in an area where it has the power to do so, the Commission is obliged to 
examine it. However, only one proposal has so far reached this stage – partly 
because of how cumbersome it is to collect and verify signatures, and because 
most petitions have been on subjects outside the Commission’s competence.   
 
Implementation of such non-binding methods has proved to be a challenge in 
both cases. The UK e-petitions can easily be dismissed by Parliament. The ECI has 
faced legal, bureaucratic and technical challenges, and few European citizens have 
heard of it.29  
 
Around the world, there are several online campaigning communities that try to 
create similar petitions, but outside the formal structure of political institutions. 
Perhaps the best known is 38 Degrees, whose members decide on which issues it 
will campaign. Typical campaign activities include signing petitions, emailing or 
phoning MPs, and making donations for newspaper ads about their campaigns. 
Change.org claims to be the world’s largest petition platform, with users in 196 
countries. It is a for-profit business which sells access to members’ email addresses 
to other organisations, including political groups and non-profits.  
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The UK government is trying to make more information and data available to 
citizens through several initiatives. The Office of the Parliamentary Counsel (part 
of the Cabinet Office) has a Good Law Initiative which aims to make legislation 
more accessible online by providing simpler language and explanations. The Open 
Government Partnership UK National Action Plan 2013-15 states that the 
government will promptly publish all new primary and secondary legislation on the 
website legislation.gov.uk; and make legislative data available in an open and 
accessible format to allow people to re-use content under the terms of the UK’s 
Open Government Licence. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting of all is a website called data.gov.uk, which hosts 
around 20,000 government datasets. Just over half of them are available as open 
data under the Open Government Licence, making £80 billion of government 
expenditure accessible to the public in detail. However, not all central government 
departments publish their spending data in a timely manner, in a consistent format 
or at the same level of richness, and some local authority spending data is missing 
completely. 
 
 
Community engagement 
 
Local politics attracts the most people to get personally involved, so new forms of 
digital affiliation with local civic initiatives offer great promise for revitalising 
democratic engagement. They can either focus on influencing political processes 
problems or offering citizens an independent source of information on 
parliamentary activities.  
 
For example, MySociety is a UK charity which runs four websites designed to be 
civic ‘self-help’ resources to help people to engage with political processes. The 
first is FixMyStreet:, which sends complaints from local residents (about problems 
like graffiti and street lighting) to councils on behalf of users. WhatDoTheyKnow 
facilitates freedom of information requests, while WriteToThem is a platform for 
contacting elected representatives, and TheyWorkForYou provides information 
about MPs’ activities in parliament. 
 
Likewise, NosDéputés.fr is a French platform which provides information on the 
activities of members of the National Assembly, as well as providing logistical 
information for citizens to attend parliamentary debates. OpenParlamento serves a 
similar function in Italy, by providing daily updates on parliamentary debates and 
accessible explanations of Italian parliamentary proceedings. 
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Voter education and engagement  
 
A very interesting new way of improving information to voters – and encouraging 
them to participate in elections – is the Voter Advice Applications (VAAs) in use 
across Europe. VAAs ask users for their opinions on a series of political issues to 
help them to determine how closely their policy preferences and priorities match 
those of political parties in the run-up to an election. There are currently around 40 
national-level VAAs operating in Europe, and more were created prior to the UK 
general election in 2015. The main Dutch VAA, Stemwijzer, was used 4.9 million 
times in their 2012 elections. In Germany, the state-sponsored Wahl-O-Mat was 
used 13.3 million times in the German federal election in 2013. However, the UK’s 
largest VAA, Vote Match, was used 1.1 million times in the 2015 UK general 
election, which is nowhere near the levels of engagement reached in other 
European countries.30  
 
Another VAA, DemocracyOS, was set up in Buenos Aires in 2012 by a group of 
students and hackers. It is an attempt to create an open source, free software to 
facilitate public understanding of and engagement with legislation passed through 
parliaments across the world. In Europe, a similar approach is the Open Debating 
platform, which is being used by party members (for example, by members of 
Podemos or Guanyem Barcelona in Spain) and by members of the public as a way 
of discussing bills and legislation across several European political spheres at the 
same time.31 At the time of writing, the platform is in a ‘demo’ phase, but it is 
interesting because it demonstrates a digital means of fostering more direct public 
involvement in the workings of European parliaments.32 
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4. PITFALLS OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
Digital technology clearly offers the potential of bringing more citizens into 
democracy, and improving citizens’ experience of democracy. But technology is 
not a panacea for the problems of democracy and can even make them worse if 
used ineptly. New technology allows a speed and volume of exchange that is not 
conducive to extensive and deep deliberation. But democratic procedures, 
including at the supranational level, involve thrashing out disagreements and 
reconciling different points of view, which takes time and careful deliberation. 
Internet-based political discussion creates massive mood swings, with excitement 
and mobilisation, but often little rational discourse. 
 
The online scrum is not necessarily conducive to a pluralistic debate, because 
marginal voices can be drowned out by noisy majorities. This might not matter in 
many areas of online life, but democracies are supposed to reflect the views of all 
their citizens, so technological advances should not skew political power towards 
certain groups and away from others. Moreover, certain rights and responsibilities 
in democracies should remain beyond constant popular vote – such as 
constitutional law – so the same safeguards and separation of powers should apply 
online as offline. 
 
We do not have answers to all of these challenges, but we set them out here 
because they require careful consideration when changes are made to political 
systems at many levels. We will be considering them in further detail in 
forthcoming work. 
 
 
Can MPs effectively turn the digital noise into something approximating 
citizens’ attitudes and views?  
 
For democracies to function, politicians have to avoid capture by special interests. 
New technology can make this more difficult when the intensity and scale of 
online debates make it hard for political actors to distinguish the signal from the 
noise. Social media data of the kind we present above is particularly high in volume 
and complexity, making it difficult for political actors to gauge when online data 
reflects broader public opinion, or even just the views of most online users. A 
seemingly large debate with many supporters of a particular position can instead be 
the result of a campaign by a PR firm, or a small number of angry people who are 
very active online. These effects of manipulation and amplification have always 
affected debates, but they are harder to discern in online activity, so political actors 
need better ways of telling which communications really reflect the views of many 
citizens. 
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Will web-based technologies entrench existing inequalities? 
 
There is a danger that the opening up of democracy with digital tools will create 
more democratic inequality, meaning that people who are already political engaged 
can use new technology to extend their influence within the political system, while 
others remain powerless. The explosion of new digital practices has occurred 
within a social context where many people are excluded from participating, or are 
just unaware of them. Not everyone uses social media, and the poorest and most 
vulnerable in society are least likely to have access. As political processes and 
debates evolve in response to new technology, it is important that digital views are 
not heard above others, and especially not over those of the digitally dispossessed, 
many of whom are already disadvantaged by lack of access to political expression 
and participation.  
 
 
If technological innovations fail, do citizens feel even more let down?  
 
The introduction of exciting new reforms can do more harm than good if they 
ultimately fail to deliver a better quality of engagement for citizens. A recent study 
of MySociety found no evidence that use of the sites had produced any marked 
shifts in users’ feelings towards governing authorities and their ability to influence 
such bodies. Moreover, the European Citizens’ Initiative and the UK e-petitions 
do not appear to have resulted in more engagement by citizens. In practice, very 
few petitions have resulted in any subject being discussed by the European 
institutions or the British parliament.  
 
The weight of public expectation is rarely met, even when a large number of 
people participate; for example, 2 million people signed the latest ECI called ‘Stop 
TTIP’, well above the 1 million threshold required for valid ECIs. Procedures 
remain unnecessarily complex and hard to understand to the public; for example, 
few of the people who signed an e-petition were aware that it required an MP to 
bring it to debate in the UK parliament. But more worryingly, none of the first 
successful ECIs ever led to concrete policy proposals – suggesting that citizens 
might feel even more let down if their millions of signatures do not cause tangible 
political change.  There is even a danger that the e-petitions may give more 
influence over House of Commons debating time to media and campaigning 
organisations, as they can raise the profile of e-petitions but already have much 
greater lobbying resources than ordinary citizens do. 
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How to balance transparency with the need for privacy? 
 
There are growing concerns about data privacy and personal information on 
individuals being shared with third parties.  Indeed, over the last few years, worries 
about data privacy have increased, partly a result of people sharing more 
information about themselves online, and partly a result of a revelations about 
government surveillance and private company data collection. In a typical week, 
for example, Facebook users upload twenty billion pieces of content. Smartphones 
are full of apps that collect information about your activities, every waking and 
sleeping moment. Some analysts estimate we each give away £5,000 worth of data 
annually – although no one really knows. While there is great potential for 
governments and public institutions to open up more of their data and information 
to the public, this needs to be done with strong protections for data privacy. 
Existing and forthcoming data protection regulations put restrictions on how 
personal data can be held and shared. Government institutions need to balance 
openness and transparency against necessary safeguards for personal information.  
 
 
How to avoid the data deluge? 
 
The UK parliament recently conducted a ‘Commission on Digital Democracy’, 
which found that e-petitions have led to many more people engaging with their 
MP. However, they also make it more difficult for MPs to respond to constituents 
personally. Parliamentarians’ inboxes get clogged up with template emails, among 
which individual messages from constituents who need help are in danger of 
getting lost. MPs complain that it is impossible to respond to the volume of 
requests received.  
 
The research on Twitter messages sent to MEPs presented above shows a similar 
problem. Based on our research, the MEPs received an average of 2,132 tweets 
each over 4 week period we collected data, and many received significantly more 
(three received over 100 thousand). To read and answer so many messages is a 
significant burden for MEPs and their assistants. Measures to help politicians to 
filter and manage this deluge are urgently needed, so that they can do their job of 
representing their constituents effectively.  
 
 
Is it possible to manage online political discussions effectively? 
 
One of the key challenges with digital democracy is that large, online spaces are 
very good at gathering information, but not good at prioritising it or deliberating 
on what it means. It is still difficult to channel the incredible volume of discussion 
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and communication into any kind of collective decision-making process, let alone a 
consensual outcome. 
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CONCLUSIONS: how to seize the new opportunities of digital 
democracy 
 
If used well, digital tools might help to improve citizens’ confidence and trust in 
both political institutions and the people who work in them. But if used ineptly, 
they could make citizens feel even more disillusioned with political processes that 
seem remote, irrelevant, old-fashioned or dominated by special interests. This is 
the difficult challenge facing many liberal democracies, including the European 
Parliament and other EU institutions.  
 
In this conclusion, we set out an agenda for further exploration with examples of 
promising routes to improving voters’ experience of EU-level democratic 
processes, especially those that would address the challenges we started with: 
changing expectation; changing affiliations and location; and changing information. 
These recommendations are especially important for the European Parliament, 
which is often accused of being more remote and less directly connected to the 
concerns of voters than national or regional parliaments are. Because the 
Parliament represents such a large and geographically diverse collection of people, 
it is the ideal candidate to adopt new technology to update its methods and engage 
the public directly by taking more of its business online and making more data 
publicly accessible.  
 
To meet people’s upgraded expectations of fast and effective online services, the 
European Parliament could adopt new methods of involving voters in its 
deliberations that echo their online experience in other domains. The Parliament 
has a Facebook following of 2 million people, to which it could add further 
channels: 
 
 Use online platforms to facilitate dialogue about legislative proposals and 
their implications, including their deliberation in committees. Web tools 
exist that could enhance presentation of diverse views and considerations, 
so that citizens can see the trade-offs involved in the decisions, and 
synergies with their own individual perspectives. While the ECI has started 
the process, given the shortcomings of existing procedures, a platform 
facilitating quick yet detailed responses to initiatives could help keep voters 
engaged. For example, the Commission turned down the ‘Stop TTIP’ ECI 
over a technicality despite the large number of signatures, which is likely to 
alienate those voters.  
 
 Make deliberation more interactive. For example, when there is a new 
legislative proposal, members of the public should be able to comment on 
it, discuss it, share it and link to it. Parliaments might add ways of linking to 
the debates on certain amendments, not just as a flow from MEPs to 
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citizens, but also horizontally across and between citizens. People in one 
part of Europe should be able to see easily what their counterparts are 
thinking about – just as they can as consumers on Amazon or Facebook. 
 
To allow for stronger affiliation with what MEPs do, beyond their allegiance to 
political party groups, and find the new locations where politics now occurs, the 
European Parliament should engage with people in the forums they are already, 
using rather than expecting voters to come to them through institutional websites. 
Consumers these days expect to do more than receive information from above; 
they want to be involved in creating it, and to be able to participate directly in 
debates.  
 
 Use technology to identify issues that are important to citizens but have 
been overlooked in political processes, through direct engagement between 
citizens and parliament. For example, non-mainstream issues can be raised 
in the UK parliament through a “member’s bill” of just one MP. This is a 
valuable way of bringing voters’ non-political affiliations into political 
processes. One technical approach is to use keyword annotators  on forums 
or websites like TheyWorkForYou (and their European equivalents) to track 
keywords and issues that pop up often but do not get put into a successful 
petition, and then put those issues to MEPs. This would help to get around 
the numbers threshold problem; an e-petition with 99,000 signatures cannot 
get past the 100,000 threshold, but might still raise important issues.  
 
 It is now easier for ordinary people to lobby on an equal footing with PR 
firms and other paid lobbyists – for example creating campaigns and 
material which can be shared on public social media platforms and sent to 
elected representatives. To use it, the EU would need to create more formal 
channels for citizens to submit petitions and proposals under a unique user 
authentication system to ensure the process cannot be captured by a small 
number of vocal or influential people. ‘Block chain’ technology allows for 
verification of individual users using unique digital signatures that prevent 
users from interacting multiple times on a database. These could potentially 
be incorporated into existing petition systems – and provide an important 
democratic check on online activism.   
 
 The European Parliament should create a data dashboard that is freely 
available to all MEPs to better allow them to make sense of the new ‘digital 
commons’. This dashboard needs to be free and easy to use, built according 
to MEPs’ requirements and to ensure that other users’ privacy is respected. 
This tool would help elected representatives to collect and analyse online 
conversations, distinguish genuine users from trolls and special interest 
groups, to identify their own constituents for priority, and sort through their 
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comments according the topic and type of communication. This dashboard 
is a vital tool that MEPs need urgently, given the volume of communication 
they are now receiving.  
 
Digital technology allows many new ways of delivering information, and making 
large amounts of data accessible to improve accountability and transparency. 
Improvements in processing power, free software and other tools allow 
parliaments to produce and share new types of data to allow citizens to interrogate 
and input into political debates that would improve the functioning of the 
European Parliament. Some examples include: 
 
 If the EU provided a more engaging and accessible interface for viewing 
annual budget allocation information and quarterly financial performance 
reporting, citizens would have greater scrutiny of departmental expenditure 
and policy delivery.  
 
 The European Parliament should offer RSS syndication (a way to publish 
frequently updated information from a range of sources to users who 
request it) on the progress of draft legislation and other business, to take the 
debate to where people are already discussing the issues.  
 
 The European Parliament should use block chain technology to create 
decentralised, immutable digital public records. These new protocols are 
based on innovations used in crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin.33 
Application of this technology has so far been limited, but it potentially 
offers a new way of publishing and recording EU data – such as spending – 
in the form of a public record which can be verified by citizens. One 
example is to make publicly available all EU spending records on to a public 
database for scrutiny by citizens. Using block chain technology means the 
data cannot be tampered with by third parties, is constantly available, and 
can only be updated by verified users.   
 
 The EU institutions should adopt a policy of making publicly available all 
data for which there is no clear overriding reason for privacy (individual 
information, commercial interest or national security) in a consistent, 
machine-readable format that can be used by researchers and journalists. 
Simply declaring data sets to be open does not, in itself, make it of any 
practical use to the public, and so further investment in ensuring they can be 
understand and used by the public would strengthen the value of big data.  
 
This paper has tried to show how closing the digital chasm between people’s daily 
lives and politics could help reconnect politics and people – and that failure to do 
would be dangerous for democracy. The opportunities we identify for 
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reconnection show that new technology offers better answers to some challenges 
than to others. A further analysis of costs and benefits for these types of changes is 
necessary, but collectively they sketch out a possible way forward.  
 
Our overall conclusion is that new digital technology creates new opportunities to 
make politics and governance more democratic, transparent, accountable, inclusive 
and accessible. The challenge is to work out how to do this while avoiding the 
many pitfalls of relying too much on technocratic solutions, or imagining that 
social media and digital technology will offer simple, ready-made solutions to the 
problems faced by modern democracies. Democracies are not, and should not be, 
run like tech companies or e-commerce services. But without significant reform, 
political institutions and processes will continue to drift away from people’s lives 
and expectations, depriving politics of the broad public participation it needs to be 
fully democratic.  
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The digital revolution has disrupted politics, but it could enhance democracy. The speed 
and ease of online business can make political processes look frustratingly slow and 
inaccessible to many voters. The internet has transformed our social, personal, 
professional and economic lives, but the processes of politics and government remain 
remarkably similar to those of the last century. If voters disengage as a result, democracy 
will lose its life-blood.  
 
This short paper explores the implications of the growing chasm between how people live 
and how politics works, and how far digital technology can improve the experience of 
democracy for citizens. We present new, illustrative research on how MEPs and voters are 
using one social media platform, Twitter.  We then explore the broader implications of 
digital technology for parties and political processes.  
 
New technology is creating opportunities for new types of democratic engagement, but 
we also set out some of the challenges and difficulties of realising these opportunities. In 
conclusion, we identify a number of promising new initiatives for improving the quality of 
political engagement and how they might be implemented by the European Parliament. 
This paper is not designed to be comprehensive, but rather as a provocation to stimulate 
further research and thinking on the subject.  
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